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LITIGATING NIGHTMARES: REPRESSED
MEMORIES OF CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
In childhood sexual abuse cases, courts must balance the right of victims
to litigate their valid claims with the right of accused perpetrators to be free
from the burdens of litigation and false allegations.' These policies were closely
scrutinized by the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Moriarty v. Garden
Sanctuary Church of God.2 In this case, Amy Ferrell Moriarty did not recall
memories of being sexually abused as a child until twenty years later,3 past the
time allotted by the statute of limitations.4 Moriarty brought her claim of
childhood sexual abuse before the South Carolina courts claiming to be a
victim of Repressed Memory Syndrome (RMS), a psychological defense
mechanism in which an individual "represses" a traumatic event.5 However, the
trial court refused to hear her evidence, ruling her claim was barred by the
statute of limitations, and Moriarty appealed.6 The South Carolina Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling and officially recognized RMS as a valid theory.7
In addition, the court ruled that the discovery rule may toll the statute of
limitations for childhood sexual abuse claims upon presentation of objective
verifiable evidence of the sexual abuse and testimony of an expert witness.8
While controversy and skepticism have surrounded RMS over the past few
decades both in the court system and in the medical arena,9 South Carolina is
1. Lynn Holdsworth, Is It Repressed Memory with Delayed Recall or Is It False Memory
Syndrome? The Controversy andItsPotentialLegal Implications, 22 LAw &PSYCHOL. REv. 103,
116-17 (1998) ("Often the issues come down to balancing the rights of a victim to achieve
vindication versus the rights of a defendant to obtain and present credible evidence in his or her
defense, a task often complicated by the lapse in time from the alleged act to the time of
accusation.").
2. 334 S.C. 150, 511 S.E.2d 699 (CL App. 1999).
3. Moriarty attended Kiddie Kollege between August 1973 and May 1976. Id. at 153, 511
S.E.2d at 700. She commenced herlegal action in November 1995. Id. at 154,511 S.E.2d at 701.
4. Id. at 154, 511 S.E.2d at 701-02. South Carolina at this time required plaintiffs to bring
a cause of action for personal injury "within three years after the person knew or by the exercise
ofreasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action," S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-
3-535 (Law. Co-op. 1976), or before one year after the twenty-first birthday, if the action
accrued before 1988, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-40 (West Supp. 1998).
5. Moriarty, 334 S.C. at 152, 511 S.E.2d at 700-01.
6. Id. at 155, 511 S.E.2d at 702.
7. Id. at 161,511 S.E.2d at 7Q5.
8. Id.
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not a pioneer state in recognizing the validity of RMS." Many states, through
their courts and legislatures, have weighed the finality of the statute of
limitations against the frequent inability of victims of childhood sexual abuse
to raise an otherwise valid claim," and many states recognize RMS as a valid
theory. 2 However, not all states have permitted victims of RMS to litigate
claims of childhood sexual abuse barred by the statute of limitations. 3
The purpose of this Note is to explore the policies both for and against
allowing victims of Repressed Memory Syndrome to have their day in court.
Part II of this Note gives an overview of Moriarty and its recognition of RMS
as a valid theory. Part III analyzes the current debate in both the legal and
medical fields concerning RMS as well as its counter theory, False Memory
Syndrome. Part IV analyzes the court of appeals ruling in Moriarty by
addressing the arguments regarding the application of the discovery rule,
exploring the accuracy and efficiency of the "objective verifiable evidence"
requirement the court of appeals proposed, and examining the requirement of
an expert witness. Finally, PartV contemplates the impact of Moriarty in South
Carolina.
II BACKGROUND
Amy Ferrell Moriarty, in her early twenties, suddenly became obsessed
with masturbation while reading her nursing textbook and a popular
magazine. 4 She uncontrollably began picturing a little girl's hand masturbating
a male and soon recognized the hand as her own. 5 She subsequently recalled
the dress she was wearing during an episode of sexual abuse and the physical
characteristics of her abuser.' 6 She experienced a "strong reaction" when
revisiting her childhood daycare center, Kiddie Kollege Day Care Center.'
7
Moriarty filed suit against Garden Sanctuary Church of God, the operator
of Kiddie Kollege Day Care Center, within three years after the initial
recollection of the alleged childhood sexual abuse. 8 Moriarty alleged causes
of action for negligent infliction of severe emotional distress, invasion of
privacy, negligent supervision, and breach of warranty. 9 She sought damages
10. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 117, 121 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 117.
13. See infra note 121.
14. Moriarty, 334 S.C. at 153, 511 S.E.2d at 701.
15. Id. at 153-54,511 S.E.2d at 701.
16. Id. at 154, 511 S.E.2d at 701. Moriarty recalled that her abuser had "crooked teeth,
bushy eyebrows, and frizzy hair." Id. Moriarty also had a "strong reaction" when viewing a
picture of an individual with bushy eyebrows and frizzy hair. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. The claim that Moriarty filed her action within three years was based on the
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for mental and emotional injuries.20 The trial court granted summary judgment
to the Garden Sanctuary Church of God based on the statute of limitations.2'
In hearing the case, the South Carolina Court of Appeals considered two
cases where relaxation of the statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse
victims was denied.' In Doe v. R.D.3 the South Carolina Supreme Court
declined to make an exception to the statute of limitations for a childhood
sexual abuse victim who suffered from Delayed Stress Syndrome.' The court
instead advocated strict compliance with the statute of limitations.' Also
significant is Roe v. Doe,26 where the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
relief to an alleged childhood sexual abuse victim stating a reluctance to apply
an exception to the statute of limitations not recognized by the South Carolina
Supreme Court.27 After analyzing these cases, the court of appeals in Moriarty
took an alternative approach.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision of
summary judgment, concluding, "repressed memories of childhood sexual
abuse can exist and can be triggered and recovered."28 The court further held
that "the discovery rule may toll the statute of limitations during the period a
victim psychologically represses her memory of sexual abuse"'29 and may be
applied in childhood sexual abuse cases upon the presentation of objective
verifiable evidence and testimony of an expert witness."
Though the court of appeals provided an opportunity for relief for victims
of RMS, the court stated a caveat: "Such memories can be inaccurate, may be
implanted, and may be attributed to poorly trained therapists or use of improper
therapeutic techniques."' The court further noted that "[i]t is important to
emphasize the presentposture ofthis case: summaryjudgment .... Obviously,
the trial court will be in a better position to evaluate the efficacy of the
repressed memory syndrome as applied to this case."32 Moriarty still has the
burden to convince the court that she is a victim of RMS in addition to proving
20. Id. at 152, 511 S.E.2d at 700. Moriarty had suffered greatly from depression and
emotional disturbances and attended counseling regularly over multiple years. Id. at 153, 511
S.E.2d at 701.
21. Id. at 155, 511 S.E.2d at 702.
22. Id. at 167-69, 511 S.E.2d at 708-09.
23. 308 S.C. 139,417 S.E.2d 541(1992).
24. Id. at 142,417 S.E.2d at 543. Bothparties in the Moriarty case agreed thatDoe v. R.D.
is distinguishable because it did not involve Repressed Memory Syndrome. Moriarty, 334 S.C.
at 167, 511 S.E.2d at 708.
25. Doe v. R.D., 308 S.C. at 142,417 S.E.2d at 543. See infra text accompanying note 103.
26. 28 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 1994).
27. Id. at407.
28. Moriarty, 334 S.C. at 161,511 S.E.2d at 705 (citing Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F. Supp.
286, 290 (D. Mass. 1996)).
29. Id. at 168, 511 S.E.2d at 709.
30. Id. at 173, 511 S.E.2d at 711.
31. Id. at 161, 511 S.E.2d at 705 (citing Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951 (1998)).
32. Id. at 161-62, 511 S.E.2d at 705.
2000
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her claim of alleged childhood sexual abuse.33 Thus, the court of appeals simply
provided Moriarty the opportunity to present her claim.34 However, the
question remains whether the action taken by the court of appeals was
appropriate or if it should have been left to the South Carolina General
Assembly.
II REPRESSED MEMORY SYNDROME
To understand Repressed Memory Syndrome, one must first understand
that memory can be broken into stages: encoding, consolidation, storage, and
retrieval," but that "repression of memory is something else entirely.
' 36
Repression is "the forcing of ideas, perceptions or memories associated with
psychic trauma from conscious awareness into the unconscious. 37  The
majority of mental health professionals will agree that repression of memories
occurs, but professionals differ on the frequency of occurrences of RMS.
3 s
A. Validity ofRepressed Memory Syndrome
Sigmund Freud first proposed the theory of a "defense mechanism that
serves to repudiate or suppress emotions, needs, feelings or intentions in order
to prevent psychic 'pain." 39 Freud theorized that the mind can repress anxiety-
provoking ideas and the uncovering of these repressed ideas and desires is
33. Id. at 173, 511 S.E.2d at 711.
34. Id. at 168,511 S.E.2d at 709 ("We express no opinion as to the viability of Moriarty's
case and leave this issue to further proceedings.").
35. See J. Douglas Bremner et al., Neural Mechanisms in Dissociative Amnesia for
Childhood Abuse: Relevance to the Current Controversy Surrounding the "False Memory
Syndrome," 153 AM. .OF PSYCHIATRY 71,72 (1996).
36. ARLYsN.McDONALD, REPRESSEDMEMORIES: CANYOUTRusTTHEM? 40 (1995). See
also Linda M. Williams, What Does it Mean to Forget Child Sexual Abuse? A Reply to Loflus,
Garry, and Feldman (1994), 62 J. OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1182, 1183 (1994)
[hereinafterReply] ("Memories ofsexual abuse may be encoded, stored, and retrieved differently
from other memories, especially when the abuse occurs under circumstances of high arousal,
terror, extreme ambivalence, where escape is impossible, or when the meaning of the abuse
could be devastating if confronted.") (citation omitted).
37. Abrams, supra note 9, at 284; see also Doe v. Roe, 955 F.2d 951,957 (1998) (defining
repression as "a psychological defense mechanism that protects the individual from being
confronted with the memory of an event that is too traumatic to cope with"); Bremner et al.,
supra note 35, at 71-72 ("In dissociative amnesia, which can be associated with exposure to
psychological trauma, information is not available to conscious awareness for an extended period
of time, although it may have an influence on behavior.").
38. Sheila Taub, The Legal Treatment of Recovered Memories of Child Sexual Abuse, 17
J. LEGAL MED. 183, 187 (1996) (citation omitted). See also Bremner et al., supra note 35, at 78
("From what is known about the effects of stress on brain systems involved in memory, there is
evidence that mechanisms other than 'normal forgetting' are probably operative in the delayed
recall of childhood abuse.").
39. ELIZABETHLOFrUS&KATHERNEKETCHAM,THEMYTHOFREPRESSEDMEMoRy: FALSE
MEMORIES AND ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 50(1996).
Vol. 51: 939
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analogous to a "'layer by layer' excavation of a 'buried city"' that should
proceed slowly.'
In 1994, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) officially recognized
RMS, referring to it by its medical term, "dissociative amnesia,""' stating:
The essential feature of Dissociate Amnesia is an inability to
recall important personal information, usually of a traumatic
or stressful nature, that is too extensive to be explained by
normal forgetfulness .... This disorder involves a reversible
memory impairment in which memories of personal
experience cannot be retrieved in a verbal form (or, if
temporarily retrieved, cannot be wholly retained in
consciousness) ....
Dissociative amnesiamost commonlypresents as aretrospectivelyreported
gap or series of gaps in recall for aspects of the individual's life history. These
gaps are usually related to traumatic or extremely stressful events.42 The APA
affirmed that dissociative amnesia differs from normal gaps in memory due to
"the intermittent and involuntary nature of the inability to recall and by the
presence of significant distress or impairment." 3 RMS can be present in any
age group, and individuals may regain memories at different times.' The APA
40. Id. at 51. Though Freud later recanted his theory about repression, claiming it was
sexual fantasies that engaged adult hysteria, other scientists and researchers produced studies
that "support Freud's originally hypothesized connection between child sexual abuse, no recall
of the abuse, and high levels of psychological symptoms in adulthood, at least in clinical
samples." Linda M. Williams, Recall of Childhood Trauma: A Prospective Study of Women's
Memories of Child Sexual Abuse, 62 J. OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1167, 1168
(1994) [hereinafter Childhood Trauma].
41. THEDIAGNOSTICANDSTATISTICALMANUALOFMENTALDISORDERS 478 (4th ed. 1994)
[hereinafter DSM-IV].
42. Id. The placement of Dissociative Amnesia in the DSM-IV is not accepted by all
psychiatrists. In a survey of 301 psychiatrists, while 35% thought Dissociative Amnesia should
be included without reservations, 48% responded Dissociative Amnesia should be included in
the DSM-IV with reservations (e.g., as a 'proposed diagnosis'). Harrison G. Pope etal.,Attitudes
Toward DSM-IV Dissociative Disorders Diagnoses Among Board-Certified American
Psychiatrists, 156 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 321, 322 (1999). In addition, while 23% thought
Dissociative Amnesia was supported by strong scientific evidence of validity, 48% of those
surveyed believed Dissociative Amnesia was supported by only partial evidence of validity. Id.
This led Harrison G. Pope et al., to conclude "our findings suggest that DSM-IV fails to reflect
a consensus of board-certified American psychiatrists regarding the diagnostic status and
scientific validity of dissociative amnesia and dissociative identity disorder." Id. at 323.
43. DSM-IV, supra note 41, at 481.
44. Id. at 479 ("The reported duration of the events for which there is amnesia may be
minutes to years."); see also R. Joseph, The Neurology of Traumatic "Dissociative" Amnesia:
Commentary and Literature Review, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 715, 721 (1999) ("Traumatic
dissociative amnesia, however, is not limited to children, but includes, "hardened soldiers," as
well as, presumably, normal adults.").
2000
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recognizes the recent prevalence ofRMS claims for"previously forgotten early
childhood traumas."
Sexual abuse is a very traumatic experience for children and is especially
conducive to Repressed Memory Syndrome.' A child who is sexually abused
is often physically and psychologically unprepared to cope with the situation
which makes escape impossible.47 The traumatic event creates memories the
child-victim simply finds overwhelming." Because of the psychological need
to adjust to the feelings of inadequacy to change the circumstance, the child
"may become adept at altering her state of consciousness." ' Thus, the victim
may develop coping strategies to "avoid reminders of traumatic events and,
ultimately, memories of the event."5
Much evidence supports the proposition that "amnesia or memory loss is
not at all uncommon following high levels of stress and arousal, or other
physical, chemical, or severe emotional insults to the brain."5' In fact, amnesia
with subsequent partial or full recovery of memories has been documented in
studies of combat soldiers, victims of kidnapping, victims of physical and
sexual abuse, people who have committed murder, individuals experiencing
natural disasters and accidents, and victims of torture and concentration
camps.52 Furthermore, various "scientific studies show that 'repressed'
45. DSM-IV, supra note 41, at 479. The APA also recognizes the various interpretations
of this increase in RMS cases: "Some believe that the greater awareness of the diagnosis among
mental health professionals has resulted in the identification of cases that were previously
undiagnosed. In contrast, others believe that the syndrome has been over-diagnosed in
individuals who are highly suggestible." Id.
46. Gary M. Ernsdorff & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Let Sleeping Memories Lie? Words of
Caution About Tolling the Statute ofLimitations in Cases ofMemory Repression, 84 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 129, 135 (1993) ("[I]t is widely accepted by clinicians that the particulars of
the trauma are especially conducive to repression of memory of the incident.") [hereinafter
Sleeping Memories].
47. Id. at 136 ("Dependent and vulnerable children, in reality, have few mechanisms by
which to leave an abusive environment. Their dependency on the abuser, which is often total,
and the abuser's age, authority, or position often make escape an impossibility.").
48. Id. at 133.
49. Reply, supra note 36, at 1183 (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 1182. See also Mary R. Williams, Suits by Adults for Childhood Sexual Abuse:
Legal Origins ofthe "Repressed Memory" Controversy, 24 J. PSYCHIATRY &L. 207,209 (1996)
(The child "develops varying degrees of psychological coping and/or blocking mechanisms,
described in the clinical literature as denial, minimization, dissociation, and various degrees of
traumatic amnesia.").
51. Joseph, supra note 44, at 715. The author continues, "(m]emory... is a biological
process, and memory loss, including stress-induced traumatic, dissociative amnesia, can
probably best be understood from a biological and neurological perspective. To rule out
neurology and biology in order to claim that amnesia does not exist, is disingenuous." Id. at 715-
16.
52. Bessel A. van der Kolk & Rita Fisler, Dissociation and the Fragmentary Nature of
Traumatic Memories: Overview and Exploratory Study, 8 J. OF TRAUMATIC STRESS 505, 509
(1995) (citation omitted). The authors further note that a 1994 study "reported complete or
partial traumatic amnesia after virtually every form traumatic experience, with childhood sexual
abuse, witnessing murder or suicide of a family member, and combat exposure yielding the
Vol. 51: 939
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memories are real and are generally as accurate as continuous memories."" Of
particular interest, Linda Williams conducted a retroactive study in the early
1990s in which 129 women were contacted that had visited the city hospital
emergency room for treatment for sexual assault in the 1970s. 4 During the
interviews, thirty-eight percent of these woman "did not report the sexual abuse
that they experienced in childhood and that had been documented in hospital
records.""5 Sixty-eight percent of the women who could not recall the prior
abuse informed the interviewer about other sexual assaults they had
experienced in childhood, involving different perpetrators and circumstances.5 6
Notably, those who did not recall the abuse were "no less likely to report the
most highly embarrassing, upsetting, and stigmatizing abuse experiences than
those who did recall," as over one-third (35%) of the former group informed
the interviewer about other sexual abuse perpetrated by family members.5 7
Williams concludes:
[t]hese findings suggest that having no memory of child
sexual abuse is a common occurrence, not only among adult
survivors in therapy for abuse but among community samples
of women who were reported to have been sexually abused
in childhood. On reinterview, nearly two fifths of the women
did not report the child sexual abuse that was documented 17
years earlier, and those who did not report appear to not recall
the abuse."8
Victims of childhood sexual abuse may experience a variety of
psychological and behavioral problems throughout their lives. Because these
highest rates." Id.
53. Alan W. Scheflin & Daniel Brown, RepressedMemory orDissociativeAmnesia: What
the Science Says, 24 J.oFPSYCHIATRY&L. 143, 183 (1996). Scheflin &Brown analyzed twenty-
five studies that fit the criteria established by Pope and Hudson, opponents of repressed
memories, and concluded:
all of them reach the same result, confirming the reality of
dissociative amnesia in a subpopulation of sexually traumatized
children. Furthermore, these studies employed a variety of
increasingly more sophisticated designs to overcome the
inevitable claims that they are methodologically flawed. Even
more significantly, no study has surfaced that refutes the
dissociative amnesia hypothesis by failing to get reports of
inability to voluntarily recall repeated childhood abuse.
Id. at 145-46.
54. Linda M. Williams, Recall of Childhood Trauma: A Prospective Study of Women's
Memories of Child Sexual Abuse, 62 J. OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1167, 1169
(1994).
55. Id. at 1170.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1173 (citation omitted).
2000
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victims often turn to psychotherapy where various techniques are employed to
recover these memories, "[ilt is therefore not surprising that traumatic events
are often fully recalled for the first time during psychotherapy." 9 While some
victims may experience a spontaneous resurfacing of the repressed memories
or regain their memories through therapy or counseling, other victims of
childhood sexual abuse never regain access to the "repressed traumatic
event." 6 These therapeutic methods for recovering memories are especially
conducive to critical analysis as the debate continues over the accuracy of
recovered memories.6'
B. Concerns About Repressed Memory Syndrome
Critics of Repressed Memory Syndrome have several concerns. Those
opposing the theory of RMS claim that memories are suggestible, malleable,
and easily distorted.62 Accompanied with this criticism is the fear of the
creation of false memories. 63 Certainly,
[W]hen a memory suddenly and explosively resurfaces after
nearly two decades, with colors, textures, sounds, smells, and
emotions remarkably preserved, and a man is charged with
murder based on the details thus revealed, then the clinical
import of that memory must at least share the stage with its
legal ramifications."4
Some are concerned that once a memory is recalled from repression, the person
becomes adamantly convinced of its truth." Because sexual abuse is a "private,
hidden act... determining guilt or innocence is usually a matter of emotion,
59. See Bremneretal.,supranote35, at 79. Psychiatrists further explain, "[p]sychotherapy
naturally involves the facilitation of recall through encouraging the investigation of feelings
related to traumatic events. The psychotherapist may provide a supportive environment that
allows the patient to experience strong emotions he or she may be afraid to experience outside
of the therapeutic setting." Id.
60. See Sleeping Memories, supra note 46, at 137-38.
61. But see Bremner et. al., supra note 35, at 79 ("The fact that traumatic events are
recalled during therapy does not necessarily imply, however, that they represent false
memories.').
62. See Sleeping Memories, supra note 46, at 167-68.
63. See Iris E. Hyman, Jr. & Erica E. Kleinknecht, False Childhood Memories: Research,
Theory, and Applications, in TRAUMA & MEMORY 175, 178 (Victoria L. Banyard & Linda M.
Williams eds. 1999) ("The creation of false memories appears to be a reliable phenomenon. It
occurs with a variety of events and populations."). The authors emphasize there are "three
conditions necessary for the creation of a false memory: event acceptance, memory
construction, and a source-monitoring error of claiming the constructed narrative as a personal
memory." Id. at 179-8 1.
64. LoFrus & KETCHAM, supra note 39, at 56.
65. RolaJ. Yamini, Note, Repressed andRecovered Memories of ChildSexualAbuse: The
Accused as "Direct Victim, "47 HASTINGs L.J. 551, 563 (1996).
Vol. 51:939
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character, and conviction." 6 Many patients enter therapy "demanding to
retrieve memories, already having the feeling that they were molested as
children."'6 Further, therapists often have difficulty discerning the validity of
their patients' recollections as "[tiherapists, unfortunately, are no better
equipped than the rest of us to discern the genuine light of truth."'6
Therapists and psychologists are often criticized at both ends of the
spectrum-for their avid assistance in the retrieval of memories and for their
quick dismissal of memories of these victims.69 Psychologists often feel
threatened by public groups who are opposed to mental health professionals
assisting in the retrieval of abusive memories." Often the validity of the
therapeutic methods are criticized and questioned.7'
One concern is the tendency of therapists to identify certain symptoms as
latent results of childhood sexual abuse.7" Therapists may overlook the
particular accuracy of a recovered memory because "the memory retrieval is
a means toward the ultimate goal of psychological healing... ."' Because of
this obliviation, "the particular attributes of the memory are not a primary
concern [for the therapist], certainly not to the extent which the law
demands. 74
Therapists are also accused of implanting notions of childhood sexual
abuse into the minds of their patients. Many critics of RMS are concerned that
"even conscientious, less culpable therapists often carelessly use the power of
66. MARK PENDERGRAST, VICTIMS OF MEMORY INCEST: ACCUsATIONs AND SHATrERED
LIvEs 86 (1995).
67. Id. at 199.
68. LoFrus & KETCHAM, supra note 39, at 175.
69. See Taub, supra note 38, at 193 ("The public should be wary of two kinds oftherapists:
those who offer instant childhood abuse diagnoses, and those who dismiss claims or reports of
sexual abuse without exploration."); see also J. G. Benedict & David W. Donaldson, Recovered
Memories Threaten All, 27 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 427, 427 (1996) ("Accusations are
made that these memories may have been either contrived by the individual remembering or
come into being as the result of some form of hypnotic or direct suggestion by the clinician.");
Hyman & Kleinknecht, supra note 63, at 187 (stating therapists "involved must approach the
memory with caution, keeping in mind the consequences of either accepting a false (and perhaps
traumatic) memory or disregarding a true one").
70. Benedict & Donaldson, supra note 69, at 427 ("Most problematic is the danger that
many psychologists feel from highly litigious public groups who do not like any mental health
professionals being involved with individuals who are dredging up old memories of abuse.").
71. See Taub, supra note 38, at 189-90 ("There are some recovered memories of
[childhood sexual abuse] whose inherent characteristics suggest that they are not accurate and
may therefore have been implanted.").
72. See Sleeping Memories, supra note 46, at 139; see also Williams, supra note 50, at 212
(noting the increase of"a new type of litigation: civil malpractice lawsuits and administrative
complaints against therapists for implanting or encouraging false memories of abuse").
73. Sleeping Memories, supra note 46, at 161; see also PENDERGRAST, supra note 66, at
200 ("Almost all [therapists] assert that it doesn't matter whether the memories are literally true
or not.").
74. Sleeping Memories, supra note 46, at 161.
2000 EVIDENCE
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suggestion to prompt patients to come up with [false] memories of abuse.""5
This "power of suggestion" is incredibly influential since it can "convince
children and adults alike that they have repressed the memory of an event even
though the event exists only in the mind of the person supplying the
suggestions."
These therapeutic techniques used to recover repressed memories must be
scrutinized for their "high level of suggestibility."" The danger of
suggestibility centers on the highly impressionable mind of the patient who is
seeking psychological help which "may easily lead to the creation,
reinforcement, and internalization of abuse memories that never occurred.
Therapeutically induced pseudomemories may bejust as passionately believed
in and just as elaborately detailed as true memories; without independent
corroboration, there may be no way of distinguishing the two."' Even the APA
cautions that "[c]are must be exercised in evaluating the accuracy of retrieved
memories because the informants are often highly suggestible."79
Courts and legislatures must also concern themselves with the individuals
who are falsely accused of sexually abusing a child.80 False accusations may
destroy families and further deteriorate "mildly disturbed" individuals."' In
response to several unfounded sexual abuse claims, the False Memory
Syndrome Foundation (FMSF) arose in 1992 consisting of numerous
individuals who claim they were wrongly accused of committing sexual
abuse. 2 False Memory Syndrome (FMS), not medically recognized by the
75. Yamini, supra note 65, at 561 (citing Robert Sheridan, Salem Redux: Mixing Memory
and Desire, LEGAL TIMES, Oct 24, 1994, at 24).
76. E.A. Foster, Comment,RepressedMemory Syndrome: PreventinglnvalidSexualAbuse
Cases in Illinois, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 169, 179 (1996); see also McDONALD, supra note 36, at 88
(1995) ("Most people want the approval or at least the attention of their therapist. You want to
be a good client. As a result, the therapist has a subtle power over what you say .... This
therapist-pleasing is a natural, documented phenomenon.").
77. Sleeping Memories, supra note 46, at 161.
78. Richard A. Leo, The Social and Legal Construction ofRepressed Memory, 22 LAwI &
Soc. INQuIRY 653, 685 (1997).
79. See DSM-IV, supra note 41, at 480; see also Bremner et al., supra note 35, at 79
("Because of the on-going questions regarding the effects of suggestibility on recall of abuse,
it is important for the therapist to avoid imposing on the patient the therapist's own ideas
regarding a past history of abuse. Patients with PTSD and dissociative disorders may be even
more susceptible to suggestion than normal persons.").
80. See Cynthia V. McAlister, Comment, The Repressed Memory Phenomenon: Are
Recovered Memories Scientifically Valid Evidence Under Daubert?, 22 N.C. CENT. L.J. 56,56
(1996) (citing Robert G. Marks, Should We Believe the People Who Believe the Children?: The
Needfor a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute, 32 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.
207 (1995) ("While it is imperative that society protect its children from sexual abuse, it must
also consider the frightening prospect that a person may be falsely accused of sexually abusing
a child.")).
81. See Taub, supra note 38, at 214.
82. See Leo, supra note 78, at 688 (noting that one study found "thousands ofparents have
been accused (and presumed guilty) of unspeakably abusive acts that almost certainly did not
occur, and in the process have seen their families shattered, their reputations ruined, their
Vol. 51: 939
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APA, can be described as a"phrase that has come to be used mainly by persons
who believe that they have been falsely accused of abusing someone, often a
child or younger relative, in the past."83 Those falsely accused of sexual abuse
often subsequently suffer estranged relationships with friends and family
members because "[p]eople don't want to believe that a completely innocent
person could be accused of such an awful crime by his or her children. If that
were true, it could happen to anyone-it could happen to them."" FMSF
members assert "such unsubstantiated and highly suspect claims of abuse
should not be allowed in civil or criminal actions."85
False Memory Syndrome cannot discredit RMS.86 Criticism of therapeutic
techniques does not discount the theory of RMS because memory retrieval may
occur without the employment oftherapy,87 and "[e]ven many ofthe supporters
of 'false memory syndrome' agree that repression does occur, though they are
quick to point out that there are many claims of repressed memories that are not
true."88 Further, skeptics of RMS cannot disprove RMS."
IV ANALYSIS
After a lengthy analysis, the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Moriarty
recognized Repressed Memory Syndrome as a valid theory, 0 with the caveat
finances depleted, and their adult children forever lost to the recovery moment"). FMSF-inspired
literature claims False Memory Syndrome "is created by the suggestions and encouragements
of overzealous therapists who, negligently or intentionally, mislead large numbers of therapy
clients into having false memories of [childhood sexual abuse] as a way of explaining their
clients' problems and justifying years of misguided treatment." Williams, supra note 50, at
211 (citation omitted).
83. Benedict & Donaldson, supra note 69, at 427.
84. PENDERGRAST, supra note 66, at 276. Pendergrast, who was personally accused by his
own child of sexual abuse, further states that "anyone could be accused of incest without any
foundation in fact." Id.
85. Yamini, supra note 65, at 558; see also Williams, supra note 50, at 211. But see
Benedict & Donaldson, supra note 69, at 427 (stating False Memory Syndrome is "used as a
defense against the accusation by attempting to invalidate the memory information, even if
independently corroborated").
86. See Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 959 ("Thus the psychological process of memory
repression and recall is not discredited by the possibility that a false memory has been implanted.
Rather, either of these processes may explain a particular factual allegation of therapy-induced
memory recall."); see also Wendy E. Hovdestad & Connie M. Kristiansen, A Field Study of
"False Memory Syndrome". Construct Validity and Incidence, 24 J. OF PSYCHIATRY & L. 299,
330 (1996) ("In sum, the weak evidence for the construct validity of the phenomenon referred
to as FMS... lends little support to FMS theory.").
87. Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d at 959.
88. McDoNALD, supra note 36, at 71.
89. See Leo, supra note 78, at 667 ("Moreover, even in the absence of a coherent
theoretical framework or any corroborating empirical evidence for recovered memories ofabuse,
it remains impossible for skeptics [of repressed memory syndrome] to prove a negative.").
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that "such memories can be inaccurate, may be implanted, and may be
attributable to poorly trained therapists or use of improper therapeutic
techniques."'" The court of appeals subsequently observed that many victims
of RMS are barred from bringing their claims by traditional statutes of
limitations, which forbid claims to be litigated after a maximum time period
from the time the wrong is committed.' The court addressed this concern by
concluding "the discovery rule may toll the statute of limitations during the
period a victim psychologically represses her memory of sexual abuse."93 The
court further required "objective verifiable evidence" of the childhood sexual
abuse claim and the testimony of an expert witness concerning the phenomenon
of memory repression for application of the discovery rule. 4
A. Discovery Rule
The discovery rule is an evidentiary mechanism used in certain cases that
tolls the statute oflimitations until the date of discovery of the cause of action.95
The purpose of any statute of limitations is straightforward: to protect people
from the litigation of stale claims.96 However, in some situations where litigants
were unable to discover their claim before running afoul of the statute of
limitations, courts have applied the discovery rule' which tolls the
commencement of the statute of limitations until the victim discovers, or by
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the wrongful action.9" By
enforcing this alternative time frame, claims may be litigated past the statute of
limitations. Yet, a constant battle remains between the right of a victim to
litigate a claim versus the right of a defendant to be free from lawsuits after a
substantial delay in time.99
1. South Carolina
The Moriarty decision was not the first attempt in South Carolina to
expand the relief available to childhood sexual abuse victims. Two prior South
Carolina decisions explored the proposal to extend relief to childhood sexual
abuse victims: Doe v. R.D."° and Roe v. Doe.'' In Doe v. R.D. the South
91. Id. at 161, 511 S.E.2d at 705 (citing Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951 (1998)).
92. Id. at 163, 511 S.E.2d at 706.
93. Id. at 168,511 S.E.2d at 709.
94. Id. at 173, 511 S.E.2d at 710, 711.
95. BLACK'S LAW DIcroNARY 322 (6th ed. 1991).
96. Moriarty, 334 S.C. at 163, 511 S.E.2d at 706.
97. The United States Supreme Court first recognized the discovery rule for a negligence
claim of exposure to silicosis disease in Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
98. See supra note 95.
99. See supra note 1.
100. 308 S.C. 139, 417 S.E.2d 541 (1992).
101. 28 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 1994).
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Carolina Supreme Court declined to apply the discovery rule to an alleged
victim of sexual abuse diagnosed with Delayed Stress Syndrome.' °2 The court
concluded: "While the result [of extending relief] may be appealing, we are
without authority to amend our statute. An exception to the plain and
unambiguous language of our statute of limitations must come from our
legislature." 103 In Moriarty the court of appeals distinguished Doe v. R.D.
because Doe was fully aware of his sexual abuse as a child and thus did not
allege Repressed Memory Syndrome.'O' In response to Doe v. R.D., the
South Carolina General Assembly introduced a bill which would allow an
action based on sexual abuse or incest to be brought four years after
"discovering the injury and the casual [sic] relationship between the injury and
the abuse or incest." ' 5 Though the bill passed the South Carolina House of
Representatives, it was buried in the Senate Judiciary Committee and was
never enacted."°
In 1994, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Roe v. Doe'07 refused to
make an exception to the statute of limitations for a childhood sexual abuse
case from South Carolina.0 8 The court expressed reluctance to provide an
exception for the plaintiff because the South Carolina Supreme Court had
rejected any additional relief in Doe v. R.D.'09 The court in Roe v. Doe
concluded: "What we decline to do is to make the leap urged by plaintiff; that
is, to determine that the South Carolina Supreme Court would make an
exception to the statute of limitations, or apply it differently, in personal injury
cases brought by plaintiffs alleging repressed recollection.""0 The court noted
only a few states at this time had provided for additional relief beyond the
statute of limitations for victims of childhood sexual abuse."'
Four years later, the Moriarty court noted that over half of the states had
applied the discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse cases.' 2 The South
Carolina Court of Appeals revisited the proposal to make an exception to the
statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse cases and examined the
balance of the "harm of denying a remedy to a plaintiff who had no access to
102. See Doe v. R.D., 308 S.C. at 142,417 S.E.2d at 543.
103. Id. (citation omitted). However, the South Carolina Supreme Court noted "at least
three state legislatures amended the statute of limitations to accommodate adult survivors of
sexual abuse in the wake of decision [sic] such as the one we issue today." Id. at 142 n.4, 417
S.E.2d at 543 n.4.
104. Moriarty, 334 S.C. at 168, 511 S.E.2d at 709. In addition, both parties acknowledged
the distinction. Id. at 167, 511 S.E.2d at 708.
105. See H.R. 3927, 110th Leg., 1st Sess. (S.C. 1993).
106. Id.
107. 28 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 1994).
108. Id. at 407.
109. Id. at 407-08. The trial court denied a motion to certify the question to the South
Carolina Supreme Court. Id. at 406.
110. Id. at 407.
111. Id. at 408, nn.1-2 (Hall, J., concurring).
112. See Moriarty, 334 S.C. at 164,511 S.E.2d at 707.
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her memory against the hardships faced by a defendant defending against such
longstanding claims..". The court then decided to apply the South Carolina
discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse cases, 4 which allows a claim to be
brought within three years of the "discovery" of the cause of action."'
2. Other Jurisdictions
Washington was the first state to apply the discovery rule to civil cases of
childhood sexual abuse." 6 Since then, many states have followed and allowed
for some form ofrelieffrom the statute oflimitations to childhood sexual abuse
victims who suffer from repressed memory syndrome."7 Many states have
simply adopted the discovery rule or extended the statute of limitations for
some fixed amount of time afterreaching the age of majority."8 However, very
few states require, as Moriarty does, objective verifiable evidence before a
113. Id.
114. Id. at 168, 511 S.E.2d at 709.
115. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-535 (West Supp. 1998). The statute states "all actions initiated
under Section 15-3-530(5) must be commenced within three years after the person knew or by
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known that he had a cause of action." Id.
116. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (1) (West Supp. 1999).
117. See ALASKA STAT. § 9.10.140 (Michie 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-130 (Michie
Supp. 1999); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§340.1 (WestSupp. 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-
103.7 (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(7) (West Supp. 1999); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
110/13-202.2 (WestSupp. 1999); IOWACODEANN. § 614.8A(West 1999); KAN. STAT.ANN§ 60-
523 (Supp. 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 260, §4C (West Supp. 1999); ME. RaV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 752-C (West Supp. 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 (West Supp. 1999); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 537.046 (West Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 11.215 (Michie 1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4 (Supp. 1992); N.J STAT. ANN § 24:61 B- I
(West Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-30 (Michie Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 95(6) (West Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117 (Supp. 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-51
(1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 26-10-25 (Michie 1999); UTAH CODE ANN § 78-12-25.1
(Supp.1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 522 (Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN § 8.01-249(6) (Michie
Supp. 1999); WASH. REv. CODEANN. § 4.16.340 (West Supp. 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.587
(West 1997); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-105 (Michie 1999); see also Peterson v. Huso, 522 N.W.2d
83, 86 (N.D. 1996) (interpreting N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(1) (1991), which allows 2 years
to sue for assault "after the claim for relief has accrued" as "two years from the time of discovery
to begin an action for sexual assault and battery").
118. S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 21 (Tex. 1996) ("Essentially, there are two generations
of statutes addressing the problem of delayed accrual for childhood sexual abuse cases. The first
generation simply adopted the discovery rule or extended the statute of limitations for some
fixed, extended period after the minor reached majority."); see also Taub, supra note 38, at 197
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childhood sexual abuse claim may be heard. ' 9 These states generally impose
additional requirements to avoid a flood of fraudulent claims.'2 °
Despite the expansion in the number of states applying the discovery rule
for RMS cases, many states still refuse to apply the discovery rule in childhood
sexual abuse cases.' 2' The courts and legislatures of these states cite concerns
for the lack of evidence to support the theory of repression' and the unfairness
of bringing expired charges against defendants."n These courts adhere to strict
compliance with the statute of limitations and decline to make a policy
change.124 InDalrymple v. Brown,'2S the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted
the plaintiff's lack of evidence of the injury and stated:
119. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CoDE § 340.1 (West Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT.ANN. tit. 12,
§ 95(6) (West Supp. 2000).
120. See S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 21 (Tex. 1996) ("The second generation of statutes,
including amendments to existing statutes, is more complex and gives greater weightto avoiding
the danger of possibly fraudulent claims."). The Texas Supreme Court further stated:
"Legislatures have begun to strike a more complex balance between the risk of cutting off
meritorious claims and the dangers of fraudulent claims." Id. at 22.
121. See, e.g., Doe v. Maskell, 679 A.2d 1087 (Md. 1996). The Maryland court held:
We are unconvinced that repression exists as a phenomenon
separate and apart from the normal process of forgetting.
Because we find these two processes to be indistinguishable
scientifically, it follows that they should be treated the same
legally. Therefore we hold that the mental process of repression
of memories ofpast sexual abuse does not activate the discovery
rule. The plaintiffs' suits are thus barred by the statute of
limitations. If the General Assembly should wish to rewrite the
law, that is its prerogative and responsibility.
Id. at 1092; see also Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (declining to
apply the discovery rule); Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164, 171 (Pa. 1997) ("Pennsylvania's
traditional approach to application of the discovery rule is preferable to the subjective analysis
employed by other jurisdictions.").
122. See Christina J. D'Appolonia, Note, Nuccio v. Nuccio: The Doctrine of Equitable
Estoppel Will Not Bar the Statute ofLimitations Defense in a Child Sexual Abuse Case Involving
RepressedMemory, 49 ME. L. REV. 235,241 (1997) ("Judicial wariness in deciding cases of child
sexual abuse involving repressed memory generally stems from the lack of empirical evidence
supporting the theory of repression.").
123. See Leo, supra note 78, at 676. Leo writes:
The changes in statutes of limitations for allegedly repressed
memories of childhood sexual abuse are.... deeply unfair to
defendants who must confront allegations of abuse many years
or decades later, after evidence is likely to have been lost or
destroyed, witnesses are likely to have disappeared or become
unavailable, and memories have decayed.
Id.
124. E.g., Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321,329 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding "there is no
authority for the adoption of such a rule in child sex abuse cases in New York"). The District
Court further stated: "[b]elieving it unwise and unjustified to do so, this Court declines to work
a total revision of the state's policy in this area, and accordingly declines to invent a delayed
discovery doctrine for this case." Id. at 330.
125. Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164 (Pa. 1997).
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To require an alleged tortfeasor, no matter how heinous the
allegations, to respond to claims of an injury many years after
the fact, where the only 'evidence' of the actual injury is held
in the 'memory' of the accuser, would allow the exception
known as the discovery rule, to swallow the rule of law
embodied within the statute of limitations itself.1
26
Many fear "the mere accusation of child abuse has a dramatic and negative
effect on the professional, personal and social relationships of an accused."'
27
Adhering to the statute of limitations "prevents the innocently accused of being
dragged through the legal system, and families from being further wrenched
apart."'28 Further, applying the discovery rule in childhood sexual abuse cases
may prove dangerous since judges may not be able to distinguish "between




Courts in recent years have generously applied the discovery rule in cases
where the victim was helpless in bringing a claim before the close of the statute
oflimitations. 3 ° A strong policy rationale exists for applying the discovery rule
in situations where the victim was unable to bring a claim because memories
of childhood sexual abuse were repressed.13 ' Because RMS is recognized as a
126. Id. at 170.
127. Sleeping Memories, supra note 46, at 168.
128. Id. at 165. But see Rosemarie Ferrante, Note, The Discovery Rule: Allowing Adult
Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse the Opportunityfor Redress, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 199,212
(1995). Ferrante states:
The debate regarding the validity of repressed memories should
not prevent the discovery rule from bringing relief to those adult
survivors of sexual abuse who have meritorious claims. The
argument that no adult survivor of childhood sexual abuse
should have access to redress because of the potential for false
claims is misguided.
Id.
129. Sleeping Memories, supra note 46, at 162-63 (citations omitted). Further, "[wi]hen
false memories are created by misinformation, the holders of these memories can describe these
false creations in great detail and with great conviction. Moreover, studies have shown that a
subject's confidence in a specific memory is not necessarily related to the accuracy of that
memory .... ". Id.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 117, 118.
131. See Scheflin & Brown, supra note 53, at 182 ("[T]here is a scientifically provable
class of sexual trauma victims who later in life will recover generally accurate memories of the
abuse. These individuals have rights worth protecting, especially because the 'repressed'
memory was a foreseeable consequence of, and was indeed caused by, the trauma perpetrator's
unlawful acts."); Ferrante, supra note 128, at 229 ("Arguments against applying the discovery
rule to cases of childhood sexual abuse ... are easily overcome by the interests of those who are
sexually abused as children.").
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valid disorder by the American Psychiatric Association,'32 the Massachusetts
Federal District Court noted in Shahzade v. Gregory33 that "[flor the law to
reject a diagnostic category generally accepted by those who practice the art
and science of psychiatry would be folly. Rules of law are not petrified in the
past but flow with the current of expanding knowledge. '134 The Arizona
Supreme Court in a recent RMS case described the policy rationale behind
employing the discovery rule as "logically appropriate given that the intentional
act of the tortfeasor caused both the damage and the repression of memory. To
hold otherwise would be to effectively reward the perpetrator of the egregious
nature of his conduct and the severity of the resulting emotional injury."
135
Permitting the litigation of valid claims is a fundamental attribute of the
justice system. The argument that false claims may enter the courtroom does
not discredit the policy behind applying the discovery rule for the litigation of
valid RMS claims. 36 Because the litigation of repressed memory cases will
ultimately exclude the false claims, use of the discovery rule will not
necessarily correlate with an increased amount of verdicts for invalid claims.'37
Applying the discovery rule simply permits the plaintiffs to bring their claims
132. See DSM-IV, supra note 41.
133. 923 F. Supp. 286 (D. Mass. 1996).
134. Id. at 290.
135. Doe v. Roe, 955 P.2d 951, 960 (Ariz. 1998) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court
of Arizona further held "the issues of accrual of a cause of action under the discovery rule and
tolling for unsound mind are questions of fact for the jury." Id. at 969.
136. Scheflin & Brown, supra note 53, at 183 ("[J]udges and legislators deciding whether
the delayed-discovery doctrine should be applied to toll the running of the statute of limitations
in 'repressed' memory must acknowledge that a class ofsexual victims with repressed memories
truly exists."); Ferrante, supra note 128, at 212 ("Thejustice system is capable of handling false
claims; it does so every day. Credibility is the special province of the fact-finder. If the
possibility of false claims were a basis for restricting access to court, virtually all civil claims
would never be heard."). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has stated:
[T]he fundamental complaint of lost witnesses and impaired
memories is common to all cases in which the running of the
statute of limitations has been deferred or interrupted. In each
case, considerations of staleness have been trumped by the
unfairness of requiring plaintiffs to sue at a time when, though
no fault of their own, the injury was not apparent and they could
not reasonably have known about it
.Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
137. See Susan J. Hall, Adult Repression of Childhood Sexual Assault: From Psychology
to the Media and into the Courtroom, 22 N.C. CENT. L.J. 31, 54 (1996) ("Once the statutes of
limitation have been lifted for repressed memories, the litigation itself will exclude those claims
that are based on false memories or false therapeutic input. Those plaintiffs who are victims of
repressed memories should be allowed to prove their case in a courtroom."); see also Farris, 652
A.2d at 63 (concluding that applying the discovery rule for purposes of denying the motion to
dismiss will not deprive the defendant of "his opportunity to contest the timeliness of the suit at
later stages of the litigation.").
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to court and will not cause defendants undue prejudice because the plaintiffs
must still adequately prove their claims.1
3
1
B. The Objective Verifiable Evidence Requirement
Cases of childhood sexual abuse are often a fight between the "accuser's
vividly detailed, highly emotional tale of unspeakable acts versus the accused's
simple statement that it did not happen."' 39 Therapists who aid in the retrieval
of memories are often accused of failing to independently corroborate the
patient's story to the level of proof necessary for the legal system. 4 The APA
recognizes "considerable controversy concerning amnesia related to reported
physical or sexual abuse, particularly when abuse is alleged to have occurred
during early childhood."'' Also, the APA has concluded that "[t]here is
currently no method for establishing with certainty the accuracy of such
retrieved memories in the absence of corroborative evidence."' 42
1. South Carolina
InMoriarty, the South Carolina Court of Appeals recognized that "[c]ourts,
commentators, and the medical community recognize the horrific possibility of
false accusations' '143 and held the presentation of objective verifiable evidence
regarding the claim for childhood sexual abuse is a prerequisite to applying the
discovery rule.'" The court of appeals cited the concurring opinion from Roe
v. Doe 4- in which Judge Hall proclaimed that courts in childhood sexual abuse
cases "should not allow the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations
absent corroborative evidence of both the abuse and the repression of memory
138. See Ault v. Jasko, 637 N.E.2d 870, 872-73 (Ohio 1994). The court stated:
[The] application of the discovery rule will not cause defendants
undue prejudice, as plaintiffs still bear the burden of proving
their claims. Also, defendants will be able to present expert
testimony to rebut testimony offered by plaintiffs. Furthermore,
application of the discovery rule is fair to defendants in light of
the hardship that would be visited upon plaintiffs by refusing
them a remedy for an injury they were unaware existed until
after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs with
valid claims should not be denied the opportunity to prove that
repression ofmemory precluded them frombringing theirclaims
within the statute of limitations period.
Id.
139. McAlister, supra note 80, at 71.
140. See Sleeping Memories, supra note 46, at 161.
141. DSM-IV, supra note 41, at 480-81.
142. Id. at481.
143. Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God, 334 S.C. 150,168, 511 S.E.2d 699,709
(Ct. App. 1999).
144. Id. at 171, 511 S.E.2d at 710.
145. 28 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 1994).
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of the abuse."'146 Judge Hall also cited examples for what he considered
corroborative evidence. 47
The court in Moriarty also examined the requirements set forth in S. V. v.
R.V, 148 in which the Texas Supreme Court required childhood sexual abuse
claims to be "inherently undiscoverable" and "objectively verifiable.' 49
Similar to the requirements suggested by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Texas Supreme Court, the South Carolina Court of Appeals
provided the following examples of objective verifiable evidence:
(1) admission by the abuser; or
(2) a criminal conviction; or
(3) documented medical history of childhood sexual abuse; or
(4) contemporaneous records or written statements ofthe abuser, such
as diaries or letters; or
(5) photographs or recordings of the abuse; or
(6) an objective eyewitness's account; or
(7) evidence the abuser had sexually abused others; or
(8) proof of a chain of facts and circumstances having sufficient
probative force to produce a reasonable and probable conclusion
that sexual abuse occurred.
50
146. Id. at 408 (Hall, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
147. Id. Judge Hall wrote:
Corroboration of the act itself could be obtained anecdotally
from siblings or other household members, from a documented
medical history ofchildhood sexual abuse, orby the defendant's
admission, perhaps via a letter or diary. Evidence of a prior
criminal conviction for the abuse at issue could suffice to
corroborate, as could evidence that the defendant had sexually
abused others-subject, of course, to the rules regarding proof
of 'other bad acts.' Evidence that the plaintiff had actually
repressed the memory of the abuse should be provided only by
a psychiatrist or psychologist, and then only after a thorough
clinical evaluation.
Id.
148. 933 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex. 1996).
149. Id. at 15. The Texas Supreme Court suggested the following examples of objective
verifiable evidence:
a confession by the abuser; a criminal conviction;
contemporaneous records or written statements of the abuser
such as diaries or letters; medical records of the person abused
showing contemporaneous physical injury resulting from the
abuse; photographs or recordings of the abuse; an objective
eyewitness's account; and the like. Such evidence would
provide sufficient objective verification of abuse, even if it
occurred years before suit was brought, to warrant application
of the discovery rule.
Id. at 15 (citation omitted).
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All three judges agreed that the first seven examples are sufficient to qualify as
"objective verifiable evidence."' 5 ' However, Judge Howell in his
concurring/dissenting opinion questioned the wisdom of the final example of
objective verifiable evidence given by the majority."S2 He expressed his concern
that circumstantial evidence'53 may be mistaken for "objective, verifiable
evidence."' 54 Judge Howell concluded that "by allowing plaintiffs in repressed
memory cases to corroborate their claims through circumstantial evidence, I
believe the majority opinion eviscerates the very corroboration requirement it
seeks to impose."' s
Certainly "proof of a chain of facts and circumstance" is more ambiguous
than the first seven examples and has great potential for use as a floodgate
entrance for claims of childhood sexual abuse that lack any direct evidence that
would support the sexual abuse claim. Nevertheless, restricting the objective
verifiable evidence requirements to simply the first seven examples will
drastically limit the number of claims. Because childhood sexual abuse is
inherently a private act, "photographs or records of the abuse" and an
"objective eyewitness's account" will rarely be introduced as objective,
verifiable evidence. Further, "documented medical history of childhood sexual
abuse" will be extremely rare because medical evidence is rarely obtained
unless the child is examined very soon after the abuse, which is generally not
the case if the child has repressed memories of the abuse. Thus, without the
"proof of a chain of facts and circumstances" example, the childhood sexual
abuse victim is still effectively barred from bringing a claim unless the alleged
perpetrator is a criminal," 6 has sexually abused others, or has confessed by
admission or contemporaneous records or written statement to the abuse.
Further, the eighth example provided by the court goes beyond circumstantial
evidence because itrequires "sufficientprobativeforce to produce a reasonable
and probable conclusion that sexual abuse occurred.""' 7 Thus, any potential
danger may be minimized by the court's comprehensive requests.
151. Id. at 174, 511 S.E.2d at 712.
152. Id. at 175, 511 S.E.2d 712 (Howell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
153. Circumstantial evidence is defined as "[t]estimony not based on actual personal
knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy, but of other facts from which deductions
are drawn, showing indirectly the facts sought to be proved." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 166
(6th ed. 1991).
154. Moriarty, 334 S.C. at 175, 511 S.E.2d at 712. Judge Howell further stated: "The
majority concludes that 'objectively verifiable corroboration' can be established through
circumstantial evidence. In my view, only some form of direct evidence can satisfy the
requirement of objectively verifiable corroboration of the sexual abuse." Id.
155. Moriarty, 334 S.C. at 175, 511 S.E.2d at 713.
156. Allowing a "criminal conviction" to stand as objective, verifiable evidence might be
overly broad because it does not at all relate to an individual's tendency to sexually abuse
children.
157. Moriarty, 334 S.C. at 171, 511 S.E.2d at 710 (emphasis added).
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Very few states have set up requirements for the application of the
discovery rule in childhood sexual abuse cases that approach the
comprehensiveness of the standards established by the court of appeals.'58
Other courts and legislatures have initiated a variety of methods to apply the
discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse cases.' 9 In some states, the plaintiff
must produce corroborative evidence before naming a defendant."tr
Specifically, California and Louisiana attorneys must file a "certificate of
merit" with the original complaint in which the attorney and a licensed mental
health practitioner must verify that there is a reasonable basis for asserting that
the plaintiff has been subject to the sexual abuse during her childhood.""
California protects the identity of the defendant until the court has
reviewed in camera the certificate of merit. 6 Vermont compels sealing of the
complaint,'6 3 and some states encourage use of fictitious names for the
parties.'6 New Jersey specifically forbids the admission of evidence of a
victim's previous sexual conduct'65 and protects the identity of the victim.' 66
Further, several states forbid the litigation of a claim against a deceased or
incapacitated defendant. 67
A few states require treatment of the accuser by a licensed mental health
practitioner,168and Colorado has limited the amount of damages a plaintiffmay
158. The minority of courts and legislatures simply apply the discovery rule without the
additional requirement ofcorroborative evidence. Roe v. Doe, 28 F.3d 404, 408 nn.1-2 (4th Cir.
1994).
159. See infra notes 160-171 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (g), (j) (West Supp. 1999) (delaying service
of the complaint until the court finds there is reasonable cause for filing the lawsuit and requiring
corroboration of abuse before naming the defendant); LA. STAT. REV. ANN. § 9:2800:9D (West
1997) (stating that a petition filed by plaintiffs over the age of twenty-one "may not name the
defendant or defendants until the court has reviewed the certificates of merit filed and has
determined, in camera, based solely on those certificates of merit, that there is reasonable and
meritorious cause for filing of the action"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95(6) (West 2000)
(requiring that a victim must produce objective verifiable evidence to recover damages).
161. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (d),(e) (West Supp. 1999); LA. STAT. REV. ANN.
§ 9:2800:9B (West 1997). Further, in both states the attorneys may be sanctioned for failure to
comply with the provisions. Id.
162. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(m) (West Supp. 1999).
163. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522(b) (Supp. 1999).
164. See Sleeping Memories, supra note 46, at 168 ("The use of fictitious names during
a lawsuit protects both parties from unwanted and perhaps undeserved publicity.").
165. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:61B-1(d)(1) (West 1995).
166. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:61B-1(f) (West 1995) (stating that the victim's identity will not
be released unless the victim consents to disclosure or the court determines in a hearing good
cause for the release of the information).
167. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-103.7 (West 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95(6)
(West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-25.1 (Supp. 1999).
168. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-30(A)(2) (Michie Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
249(6) (Michie Supp. 1999).
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receive. 69 If the sexual abuse occurred through a series of acts, some states
apply the discovery rule to the last act in the series.'70 Finally, many states have
enacted statutes of repose, which set a maximum limit of years a plaintiff may
bring a suit past the age of majority.'
3. Policy
South Carolina's additional requirement of objective verifiable evidence
may be viewed either as a hindrance to the litigation of sexual abuse claims or
a safeguard for protection against false memory claims. Advocates of the
objective verifiable evidence requirement claim corroborative evidence is
necessary: "In the absence of objectively corroborating evidence of
abuse-such as medical or school records, photographs, or the defendant's own
admissions-there is no justification to apply the delayed discovery rule in
cases of therapeutically de-repressed memories of abuse because these
memories of abuse are almost certainly false.' 7 2
However, this corroboration for the claim is often difficult or impossible
for the childhood sexual abuse victim to obtain because the act occurred several
years prior to the claim, and the victim might have severed relations with
friends and family members of the past." Even the courts that permit
application of the discovery rule for RMS cases admit that the authenticity and
169. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-80-103.7 (3.5)(c) (West 1999) (allowing recovery only
for damages for medical and counseling treatment and costs and attorney fees once the plaintiff
reaches the age of 33).
170. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-80-103.7 (West 1999); 735 ILL. COMP. ANN. STAT.
5/13-202.2 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN§ 60-523 (Supp. 1992); OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95
(1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 522 (Supp. 1999).
171. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95(6) (West 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
249(6) (West Supp. 1999).
172. Leo, supra note 78, at 677.
173. See Sleeping Memories, supra note 46, at 167. Experts argue:
It must be acknowledged that the requirement of corroboration
might have the effect of unfairly barring valid suits. Imagine the
difficulty faced by a survivor of childhood sexual abuse trying
to obtain corroborating evidence for acts that occurred ten,
twenty, or more years previously. Additionally, survivors may
have long since severed all ties with their families, friends, and
past, making collection of corroborating evidence difficult or
impossible.
Id. To the contrary:
Actions by adults are arguably in some ways more appropriate
for the judicial process. In light of the fact that without an
extension of time most victims of CSA are deprived of a
meaningful opportunity to sue for their injuries, most courts and
legislatures so far have agreed that an extension of time to sue
is appropriate.
Williams, supra note 50, at 219.
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reliability of these recovered memories will be an issue at trial." One lawyer
notes: "The judicial policy issue really comes down to whether adult
[childhood sexual abuse] actions are, as a general rule, so lacking in probative
evidence as to render them unfit for the judicial process."'75
Considering the difficulty of providing direct evidence for childhood
sexual abuse claims and the high number of states that simply apply the
discovery rule without additional requirements, the first seven examples of
objective verifiable evidence provided by the South Carolina Court of Appeals
appear rigid. However, the final example provided by the Court of Appeals
which allows for a "proof of a chain of facts and circumstances having
sufficient probative force to produce a reasonable and probable conclusion that
sexual abuse occurred"'76 will advance the most litigation of childhood sexual
abuse claims in the South Carolina courts and give the greatest deference to
trial court judges. Moreover, allowing claims to advance that comprise of a
"proof of a chain of facts and circumstances having sufficient probative force
to produce a reasonable and probable conclusion that sexual abuse occurred"
is consistent with the policy reasons behind applying the discovery rule to
childhood sexual abuse cases. Further, plaintiffs who wish to litigate claims
under the discovery rule in South Carolina are not required to meet such
demanding, objective standards.
C. The Expert Witness Requirement
Many courts and legislatures advocate the testimony of an expert witness
during trial to explain the ambiguous nature of RMS to the jury. In Moriarty
the court of appeals required an expert witness in childhood sexual abuse cases
to prove the allegations of repressed memory. '77 The court noted the importance
of expert testimony since "repressed memory syndrome is an area which is
outside the common knowledge and experience of most lay persons." '
174. See McAlister, supra note 80, at 77.
175. Williams, supra note 50, at 219.
176. Moriarty, 334 S.C. at 171,511 S.E.3d at 710.
177. Id. at 173, 511 S.E.2d at 711.
178. Id. (citing Spartanburg Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Bulso, 308 S.C. 322,417 S.E.2d 648 (Ct.
App. 1992)). The court of appeals noted the authority of a trial judge to qualify an expert witness
according to Rule 702 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence which provides: "[i]fscientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." S.C. R. EVID.
702. See also Armstrong v. Union Carbide, 308 S.C. 235, 238, 417 S.E.2d 597, 599 (1992)
(holding that in that case "expert testimony was important because the medical effect of
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Other courts also require expert testimony in RMS cases.'"9 Expert
witnesses are valuable because they emphasize the extent of scientific
knowledge concerning memory and its accuracy of recalled events, as well as
external factors and surrounding circumstances which may influence
memory. 180 In State v. Hungerford,8' the New Hampshire Supreme Court held
the testimony oftheplaintiffs concerning RMS "couldnotbe understoodby the
average juror without the assistance of expert testimony. Their memory of the
events described above, according to the theory, has undergone a physiological
process unlike ordinary memory, with which an average juror would be
familiar."' 2 One professor also notes:
[T]he concept ofrepressedmemory is likely to be beyond the
ordinary experience and understanding of the average juror.
Yet, at the same time, because the concept of recovered
memory is so intuitively plausible and because American
society is currently so obsessed with allegations of childhood
sexual abuse, cases based on highly questionable repressed
memories are unusually fraught with the potential for
wrongful conviction. If there is one psychological issue
which requires scientific knowledge to be properly
understood, it is the concept of repressed memory.' 83Certainly
expert witnesses can be vital in determining the outcome of
the case, as the expert's perspective on memory and its
recovery may be influential.'
However, the expert witness requirement may be a useless burden on the
plaintiff if viewed as merely an additional cost in proving the case. Judge
179. See, e.g., Shahzade v. Gregory, 923 F. Supp. 286, 287 (D. Mass. 1996) ("The Court
acknowledges the appropriateness of an expert in this type of case ... ."); Barrett v. Hyldburg,
487 S.E.2d 803, 807 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (ruling on a motion in limine that the "plaintiff may
notproceed with evidence ofher alleged repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse without
accompanying expert testimony on the phenomenon of memory repression"); State v.
Hungerford, 697 A.2d 916,921-22 (N.H. 1997) ("[E]xpert testimony is required when the issues
in a case are particularly esoteric or when the matter to be determined by the trier of fact is so
distinctly related to a particular science, occupation, business, or profession that it is beyond the
ability of the average layperson to understand.") (citation omitted);. But see McAlister, supra
note 56, at 71 (citation omitted) (noting defendants have challenged the expert witness testimony
in some RMS cases by "raising scientific arguments to exclude both lay witness testimony and
expert testimony").
180. See Sleeping Memories, supra note 46, at 172-73.
181. 697 A.2d 916 (N.H. 1997).
182. Id. at 922.
183. Leo, supra note 78, at 681.
184. See PENDERGRAST, supra note 66, at 93 ("In court, 'expert' psychological witnesses
such as Lenore Terr of Elizabeth Loftus have swayed juries toward crucial decisions. Because
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Howell noted in his opinion in Moriarty that "[t]he majority opinion clearly
imposes an additional burden on plaintiffs in repressed memory cases by
requiring expert testimony to establish the fact of the plaintiff's repressed
memory."'85 Judge Howell goes on to state: "if circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to satisfy the corroboration requirement, the requirement [of an
expert witness] becomes meaningless." '186 However, though expert witnesses
do come at a price, the risk of the jury not understanding the implications of
RMS is a far weightier matter. The primary purpose of an expert witness in a
trial is to assist the trier of fact. RMS is a complex and controversial area that
must be fully explained to the jury. Further, "defendants have a right to an
impartial jury, and one informed about the difficult authenticity issues
surrounding previously repressed memories."'
8 7
VI. CONCLUSION
Sexual abuse cases embody controversial issues and are often characterized
by an insufficiency of evidence. By adding decades of time between the abuse
and litigation, the theory of Repressed Memory Syndrome only increases the
sensitivity of the subject. Caution is imperative in this context because the
therapeutic techniques used to recover memories can lead to the "recovery" of
false memories. Further, a false accusation of sexual abuse may virtually
destroy a person's life.
Prior to Moriarty, South Carolina recognized several of these concerns
through its courts, which denied relief to a childhood sexual abuse victim
suffering from Delayed Stress Syndrome, and through its legislature, which
buried a proposed bill providing additional relief to childhood sexual abuse
victims in a committee. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also refused to
extend South Carolina's statute of limitations for childhood sexual abuse cases
without the leadership of the South Carolina courts or legislature.
Yet the American Psychiatric Association has since recognized
Dissociative Amnesia as a valid theory. Many studies and research now support
the theory of RMS. Further, the majority of states now apply the discovery rule
to childhood sexual abuse cases, notably without additional requirements. At
its core, the South Carolina Court ofAppeals's decision inMoriarty effectively
recognized the advancement in medical understanding regarding RMS as well
as its treatment in other states and has thus balanced the need for legal relief for
victims of RMS by providing them with the opportunity to litigate their claims,
provided that the claims are supported by objective verifiable evidence.
Notably, few states have initiated this exception to the statute of limitations
through the courts. Most states have relied on their legislatures to change this
185. Moriarty, 334 S.C. at 175, 511 S.E.2d at 712 (Howell, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
186. Id.
187. See Sleeping Memories, supra note 46, at 173.
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area of the law. Though it is quite appropriate for the South Carolina Court of
Appeals to initiate this exception, it would be wise for the General Assembly
to follow through with a statutory application of the discovery rule to childhood
sexual abuse cases. Regardless, the application of the discovery rule to
childhood sexual abuse cases is an important progression for South Carolina
because valid claims of childhood sexual abuse, supported by objective
verifiable evidence and expert testimony, should be litigated.
Laura Johnson
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